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When the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was 
established in 1993, the fabric uniting the Balkans was ripping apart.  How could an 
ad hoc Tribunal, thousands of kilometres from the conflict with no enforcement 
apparatus, ameliorate the anarchy and destruction sweeping the region? In its early 
years it languished almost unused, its courtrooms empty.  In 2005, as the ICTY 
moves slowly towards the completion of its mandate, increased international pres-
sure has led to a series of surrenders of indicted suspects.1  It is a significant 
achievement that Slobodan Milosevic, the alleged architect of so much of the car-
nage in the Balkans, now sits in the dock of the ICTY, defending charges of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.  His favoured approach is to play the 
martyr.  He has repeatedly refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
                                                          
*Assistant Legal Officer, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.  The views ex-
pressed herein are personal to the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.  
  
1 See, Human Rights Watch, Real Progress in The Hague, available at  
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/29/serbia10386.htm> (last visited Mar.  29, 2005).   
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denouncing it as an instrument of anti-Serb propaganda.2  The outcome of his trial, 
and the evaluation of the processes by which it has been conducted, will have 
significant ramifications for the future of international criminal law.3  
 
According to its own self-description, the ICTY ‘provides a forum and framework 
for the enforcement of existing international humanitarian law.’4  There is no doubt 
that the ICTY has made a very substantial contribution to this jurisprudence.  The 
success of the Tribunal, however, will be measured not only by its legal output but 
also by the political role it has played in achieving justice for the victims of the 
conflict in the Former Yugoslavia.  The political and legal matrix of the Tribunal is 
the topic addressed in Rachel Kerr's The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia: Law, Politics and Diplomacy.5  Unfortunately, the book is 
disabled by a sometimes unfocused thesis and the author's uncertain evaluation of 
the ICTY's political and legal achievements.  
 
Rather than a collective imputation of guilt towards an entire nation or people, 
international criminal law focuses on the accountability of individuals.  Interna-
tional criminal law can serve as an official forum for acknowledging past guilt, a 
putative demonstration of the power of law to gather history and memory towards 
justice and, perhaps, the truth; it also attempts to provide the certainties of law’s 
order, predictability and impartiality after the chaos of war.  The Dutch jurist 
B.V.A.  Röling noted that 
 
the foremost, essential function of criminal prosecutions [is] to restore con-
fidence in the rule of law.  The legal order is the positive inner relation of 
the people to the recognised values of the community, which relation is 
disturbed by the commission of crimes.  If crimes are not punished, the 
confidence in the validity of the values of the community is undermined 
and shaken.6 
 
Perhaps most importantly, in an era in which most wars are civil or ethnic in nature, 
criminal prosecution of wartime atrocities can demystify history’s claim to be the 
authentic motor of conflict, and the incremental layering of evidence can unravel 
the historical narratives spun by cynical elites for political gain.   
 
The ends of international criminal justice in the Balkans, however, were made 
particularly difficult to attain due to the circumstances of the ICTY’s establishment.  
                                                          
2 See, e.g., Milosevic Opens his Defence Case by Going on the Offensive, THE NEW YORK TIMES (New 
York), Sep.  1, 2004; Tim Judah, Milosevic on Trial, 44(2) SURVIVAL 158 (2002); CHRIS STEPHEN, 
JUDGEMENT DAY: THE TRIAL OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (2004).   
3 See, Analysis: International Tribunals on Trial, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Aug.  31, 2004 (online) at   
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3614854.stm>. 
4 Prosecutor v.  Delalic et al (Celebici) (Trial Chamber Judgment), (1998) Case No IT-96-21-T, 417. 
5 RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: LAW, 
POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY (2004). 
6 B V A Röling, Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the Laws of War, 12 REVUE B.  D.  I.  8, 22 
(1976) cited in Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment 
of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law 9(1) EUR. J. INT. LAW 2, 9 (1998). 
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Unlike the International Military Tribunals in Tokyo and Nuremberg, the ICTY was 
not created with the backing and resources of the great powers after a peace had 
been imposed.  Instead, it was established at a time of increasing bloodshed in the 
Balkans; the horrifying apex of the conflict, the massacre of 7,000 at Srebrenica in 
1995, had not yet occurred.  Somewhat optimistically, Pierre Hazan has noted that 
“the Security Council’s actions thus laid down a legal absolute which was emi-
nently moral: the conditions of peace were to be subordinated to the exercise of 
justice.”7  However, a more cynical explanation for the establishment of the ICTY 
also presents itself.  The reversed order of precedence between peace and justice 
was a risky strategy, bound to involve compromises and to draw criticism of its 
impotence.  If its establishment was meant to bring hope of a truly just peace, said 
the doubters, then this was useless idealism; if the ICTY was the extent of the 
international community’s involvement, then it was a cynical abdication of true 
moral responsibility.   
 
In 1992 the US public, and a world that had said “never again” to the horrors of the 
Holocaust, had been shocked to see television images of emaciated prisoners staring 
blankly from behind barbed wire.  There were reports of prisoners being herded 
onto cattle cars, of unspeakable barbarities perpetrated in death camps.  But in 1992 
the US public had been equally horrified to watch, in Somalia, dead American 
troops dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by warlords.  Military intervention 
in Bosnia was too risky; the rigid “Powell doctrine”, grounded firmly in the calcula-
tion of national interest, spoke decisively against it.  The creation of an international 
tribunal – another Nuremberg – would satiate the public desire for tangible action 
while avoiding any chance of “Somalia syndrome.” The establishment of a tribunal, 
in other words, would place the West beyond moral reproach without incurring the 
military risk.  What could be more ethical than offering justice instead of more war, 
indictments and prosecutions instead of ammunition? 
 
Rachel Kerr sees the establishment of the ICTY as a tripartite collaboration involv-
ing a nascent international criminal law, an international security framework inter-
preting the UN Charter to promote human rights, and a world of international 
relations released from Cold War partisanship.8  Whether Kerr sees this collabora-
tion as a coincidence or the result of international law’s inner teleology is unclear.  
After a whirlwind tour through the positivist, natural law and process schools of 
legal thought, Kerr cites with approval Geoffrey Robertson’s lofty pronouncement 
of a “seismic shift from diplomacy to legality in the conduct of world affairs.”9  But 
an endorsement of this view militates against the project Kerr has set for herself.  
Her focus is on the way in which diplomacy and international politics have acted as 
external pressures upon the Tribunal’s inner workings and have contributed to its 
functioning.  But a perspective in which diplomacy and politics wither away to 
                                                          
7 Pierre Hazan, The Revolution by the ICTY: The Concept of Justice in Wartime, 2 JOURNAL I.  CRIM.  
JUSTICE  533, 533 (2004). 
8 KERR, supra note 5, at 12. 
9 Id., at 17. 
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reveal a fluid system of international criminal law is at odds with Kerr’s thesis and 
with the evidence contained throughout the book. 
 
Kerr’s account of the Tribunal's establishment and early years vacillates between a 
vision of the Tribunal as a portent of the new world order’s commitment to justice 
and a recitation of the presence of realpolitik in its establishment and enforcement. 
Kerr first outlines the “revolution” that took place when the Security Council 
proposed a Tribunal to deal with a situation in the Former Yugoslavia that 
amounted to a threat to international peace and security. The establishment of the 
Tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was a recognition that war criminals 
on the loose could constitute threats to the international order and was, Kerr 
suggests, “an explicit recognition of the link between peace and justice as mutually 
reinforcing objectives.”10  Some pages later, however, she cites an author who 
questions “whether the nexus between peace and justice was simply an expression 
of outrage clothed in judicial terminology in order to legitimise the application of 
Chapter VII.”11 Kerr, perhaps unsure of her own opinion, does not attempt to 
address this issue, or others which render problematic a simple belief that justice 
and peace reinforce one another. 
 
For a book that seeks to understand the interrelationship between international law 
and politics, the treatment of the diplomatic context in which the Tribunal was 
established is remarkably thin. Kerr’s discussion of the lead-up to the establishment 
of the Tribunal contains little analysis or discussion of the complex motivations 
driving the process.  For example, Kerr mentions, in the discussions leading to the 
passage of UN Resolution 827 setting up the Tribunal,12 the so-called “naming 
names speech” of former US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.13  In that 
speech, to the consternation of many pushing for a diplomatic solution and an 
immediate ceasefire, Eagleburger identified a number of Serb leaders, including 
Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, as suspected perpetrators of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.  This was a significant step in US policy and 
helped build momentum for a Tribunal.14  But Kerr does not examine how the 
declaration of international legality was used for strategic ends.  Eagleburger’s 
speech has also been interpreted as an implicit rejection of the Vance-Owen plan – 
a peace proposal which would have left Bosnia as a single state partitioned into 
cantons determined by ethnic composition – and an example of the way in which 
                                                          
10 Id at 19; Cf.  186-187.   In her conclusion, Kerr states that the “jury is still out” over whether the ICTY 
has helped to bring peace and justice to the Balkans.    
11 Id at 38. 
12 UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 827 ON ESTABLISHING AN 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1993); 32 
ILM 1203. 
13 Statement of Mr Eagleburger, UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE, THE NEED TO RESPOND TO WAR 
CRIMES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1992), cited in THE PATH TO THE HAGUE: SELECTED 
DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE ICTY 67 (2001). 
14 See STEPHEN, supra note 2, at 85-87. 
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law was used for political ends to disrupt the attempt to find a negotiated peace.15  
Pierre Hazan calls this technique “strategic legalism.”16  Its use demonstrates how 
delicate the process to establish a Tribunal was. If the Vance-Owen plan had been 
adopted, it is doubtful the ICTY would now exist; indeed, the ICTY’s existence was 
frequently on the verge of sacrifice at the altar of diplomacy.17  The pursuit of an 
international tribunal, in other words, did not necessarily prove the convergence of 
peace and justice; rather, it highlighted the tensions involved in attempting to ac-
commodate both in international diplomacy.  It would have been useful had Kerr 
examined the contradictions and potentially destablising effects of such a dual 
strategy.   Larry Johnson, at the time of the Tribunal’s establishment a senior lawyer 
at the UN Office of Legal Affairs, noted that the oscillation between objectives 
 
…seemed like a schizophrenia, like a discord.  I mean, either you call for a 
war crimes court and go at it, or you take the diplomatic route and negoti-
ate a peace settlement.  But both? Cynics in the [UN General] Assembly 
said this was a Madeleine Albright initiative to defend European criticism 
of the US for not putting troops on the ground in Bosnia.18  
 
Kerr’s second chapter is a discussion of the difficulties faced in establishing a 
tribunal that lacked historical precedent.  She notes that when UN Resolution 827 
was adopted, most member states did not comprehend the extent of the commitment 
they were undertaking.19  The task of establishing a fully functioning international 
tribunal was an immense enterprise. 
 
The ICTY needed a lot of money to function effectively, but it was funded directly 
out of the UN’s budget at a time when the institution was on the verge of bank-
ruptcy, largely because the US was refusing to pay its dues.20  Lack of money 
caused tremendous problems.  A location for the courtrooms had to be established, 
a detention unit had to be built, and the administrative equipment had to be pro-
vided from scratch.  Further, the Office of The Prosecutor required substantial 
funding to undertake field research, locate witnesses, establish witness protection 
programmes, and exhume mass graves.  Michael Scharf notes that in 1995, less than 
2% of the ICTY’s budget was allocated to pursue crucial prosecutorial tasks such as 
tracking down witnesses and recording and translating their accounts.21 
 
                                                          
15 Eagleburger reported that Lord Owen, who at the time of the speech was conducting delicate negotia-
tions with Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic, “made it clear that he considered [Eagleburger’s] remarks 
‘unhelpful.’” Cited in JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE 
HAGUE TRIBUNAL 40-41 (2003). 
16 Hazan, supra note 7, at 535. 
17 David P Forsythe, Politics and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 5 CRIM.  
L.  FORUM 401 (1994), cited in Michael P Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice 
in the New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal 49 DEPAUL L.  REV.  925, 932 (2000).   
18 Cited in STEPHEN, supra note 2, at 89. 
19 KERR, supra note 5, at 41. 
20 Scharf, supra note 17, at 934. 
21 Id. at 935. 
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The appointment of key prosecutorial staff was also fraught with difficulty and 
political wrangling.  The first nominee for Chief Prosecutor, the respected interna-
tional lawyer M.  Cherif Bassiouni, who had served as chairman of the commission 
of experts established to investigate war crimes in the Balkans, was rejected for the 
position, ostensibly for his lack of trial and advocacy experience.  However, ob-
servers close to the nomination process suggested that Bassiouni was viewed as an 
overzealous and abrasive idealist, whose uncompromising attitude would frustrate 
Lord Owen’s efforts to bring about a negotiated peace settlement.22 
 
Eventually, in July 1994, South African Richard Goldstone was appointed as the 
ICTY’s first Chief Prosecutor.  Although he was unfamiliar with the corpus of 
international humanitarian law, Goldstone had brought significant litigation against 
the Apartheid regime in South Africa.  He was viewed with respect, and seen as 
impartial and independent.23  Goldstone was immediately under pressure to issue 
indictments, to demonstrate that the Tribunal was a legitimate legal enterprise and 
not a chimera, for his own, as well as the Tribunal's, credibility.  Soon after his 
appointment, he was introduced to former British Prime Minister Edward Heath, 
who asked Goldstone, “Why did you accept such a ridiculous job?”24  
 
As Kerr explains, the procedures for issuing indictments, taking witness statements 
and determining the appropriate amount of evidence for an indictment were all 
uncertain, which led to tensions between the Office of The Prosecutor and the 
Judiciary.25  The Tribunal’s judges wanted arrests, but Goldstone was not prepared 
to issue indictments without incontrovertible evidence.26  Goldstone’s investigations 
focused on the atrocities that had occurred at the prison camps in Bosnia, but the 
accumulation of evidence was soon frustrated by a lack of cooperation from mem-
ber states.  The prosecutor wanted US intelligence information, but the Pentagon 
was unforthcoming.   
 
Kerr focuses on the political exigencies involved in eliciting state cooperation with 
the ICTY, and devotes two chapters to this topic.  State cooperation with the institu-
tion was obviously crucial to the fulfilment of the ICTY’s mandate.  The first Presi-
dent of the Tribunal, Antonio Cassese, put the consequences of non-cooperation 
vividly: “The Tribunal must always contend with the violent eruptions of state 
sovereignty: the effect of states’ lack of cooperation is like lava burning away the 
foundations of the institution.”27  Kerr rightly points out that the lack of an en-
forcement mechanism meant that the Chief Prosecutor and the President were 
forced to play diplomatic as well as legal roles.28  As noted by Gabrielle Kirk 
McDonald, the second President of the Tribunal,  
 
                                                          
22 KERR, supra note 5, at 51; HAGAN, supra note 15, at 33-38. 
23 Id. at 52.   
24 Cited in HAGAN, supra note 15, at 60.   
25 KERR, supra note 5, at 53-55. 
26 Id. at 57; STEPHEN, supra note 2, at 106-107. 
27 CASSESE, supra note 6, 12. 
28 KERR, supra note 5, at 115.   
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…during my presidency, it seemed to me that my duties as a judge were 
subjugated by the political demands of the office.  I was required to spend 
an inordinate amount of time seeking international political support to 
overcome the effect of state non-cooperation, especially by the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia as the crisis in Yugoslavia unfolded, after I as-
sumed office…Therefore, although first and foremost a judge, it appeared 
to me that I most often functioned as an ambassador.29 
 
The legal framework demands state compliance with the ICTY.  Article 25 of the 
UN Charter provides that all member States are required to undertake directives 
issued by the Security Council. Article 25 encompasses decisions taken by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII, pursuant to which the ICTY was estab-
lished.  Article 29 of the ICTY Statute requires all states to comply with the re-
quests of the Tribunal for judicial assistance.30  Further, additional compliance 
obligations flow from the grave breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions and 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.31  The 
Dayton Accords also contained several provisions requiring parties to cooperate 
with the ICTY.32  Therefore, pursuant to its legal framework, the ICTY does not 
function as a State entity in international law to which states owe horizontal obliga-
tions; judicial assistance is a vertical obligation on States stemming from the 
ICTY’s authority as a body established pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter.33  Predictably, however, state cooperation has rarely flowed from the promise of 
compliance with international law alone; political and economic incentives have 
been instrumental in securing judicial assistance to the ICTY. 
 
Kerr’s chapters on judicial assistance to the Tribunal are the most useful and inter-
esting of the book.  She discusses in detail the content of the various Security 
Council resolutions creating enforcement obligations, the developments leading up 
to the Dayton Accords, the increasing level of NATO support for locating suspected 
war criminals, and the use of economic leverage to elicit cooperation with the 
Tribunal.  She suggests that cooperation with the ICTY began to improve following 
                                                          
29 Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Problems, Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY, 2 JOURNAL I.  CRIM.  
JUSTICE.  558, 568 (2004). 
30 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia adopted 25 May 1993 by UN 
Resolution 827. 
31 GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND THE SICK 
IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, art 50 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950); GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF 
WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA, opened for signature 
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, art 51 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, art 130 
(entered into force 21 October 1950); GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF 
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, art 147 
(entered into force 21 October 1950); CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE 
CRIME OF GENOCIDE, opened for signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277, art 280 (entered into force 
12 January 1951). 
32 See SCHARF, supra note 17, at 953-954. 
33 See Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law: The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 N.Y.U.  J.  INT'L L.  & POL.  417 (1999). 
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the Dayton Accords and the introduction of the 30,000 strong NATO stabilisation 
force, SFOR.34  Kerr’s discussion of the early inaction of IFOR, the original NATO 
Implementation Force, would have been strengthened by a discussion of the limita-
tions in IFOR’s mission statement, and the political considerations involved in the 
decision to provide IFOR with such a restricted mandate.  Richard Holbrooke, the 
US chief negotiator at Dayton, suggests that the Pentagon insisted upon limiting 
IFOR’s mission to protection and disengagement because an expanded role in 
apprehending war criminals risked 'mission-creep' to non-military objectives.35 
 
From 1997 onwards, NATO forces began to step up arrests of suspected war crimi-
nals.  But the shift in policy was pragmatic rather than principled, with much of the 
initiative to arrest stemming from soldiers on the ground, increasingly frustrated by 
the disruptions to peace and unable to stabilise the conflict due to the presence of 
war criminals.36  It is at this point that one could suggest a pragmatic alliance be-
tween peace and justice; the existence of the ICTY provided a convenient reason to 
rid the region of destabilising influences and to achieve SFOR’s political mandate.   
 
Recently, there has been an unprecedented wave of surrenders to the ICTY.37  
Economic pressure has been instrumental in eliciting this cooperation, and the EU 
has used prospective membership tied to judicial assistance as an effective way of 
ensuring the delivery of suspects. The arrest and prosecution of Muslim and Croat 
suspects has also done much to deflect criticism that the Tribunal is an anti-Serb 
institution.   
 
The ICTY is able to refer State non-compliance to the Security Council for deter-
mination.  But as Kerr notes, this strategy is not particularly effective.38  A more 
useful process in the event of non-compliance was established through Rule 61 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.39  According to Rule 61, if a State has failed 
to execute an arrest warrant, the ICTY may conduct a proceeding in which it re-
ceives evidence from the Prosecution.  If the Trial Chamber is satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds to charge the accused, the indictment is confirmed and an 
international arrest warrant is issued.  Kerr points out that such a procedure was 
particularly useful in promoting the Tribunal’s work in the early years, while the 
conflict in the Former Yugoslavia was still raging.  At that time, the governments of 
the conflict refused to cooperate with the ICTY, and Rule 61 hearings served as a 
useful means of publicising the Tribunal’s work.40  
 
Kerr states that the “main consideration with regard to Rule 61 hearings was the 
external legal and political impact.”41  Indeed, Rule 61 has been subjected to fierce 
                                                          
34 KERR, supra note 5, at 137.   
35 RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR 223 (1998), cited in SCHARF, supra note 17, at 954. 
36 Cited in SCHARF, supra note 17, at 961-962.   
37 Supra note 1.   
38 KERR, supra note 5, at 147; McDonald, supra note 29, at 562.   
39 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, IT/32/Rev.34 (‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence’). 
40 KERR, supra note 5, at 100. 
41 Id. at 102. 
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criticism because of its overtly political character, and because there is no scope for 
intervention by defence counsel.42  But as McDonald emphasises, these hearings 
also served a useful purpose at a time of sustained state non-compliance and pro-
found scepticism of the ICTY’s worth:  
 
First, the proceedings gave some solace to victims, as an opportunity to 
testify about the atrocities they alleged to have been subjected to and 
thereby inform the international community of the egregious violations 
that had occurred during the conflict.  Secondly, although not trials, they 
permitted the Tribunal to publicise its work and make its existence known.  
Finally, they were one method of triggering the reporting of state non-
compliance by the President to the Security Council.43 
 
The use of Rule 61 neatly highlights the contrasting personalities of the Chief 
Prosecutors.  Rule 61 hearings declined substantially with the appointment of 
Louise Arbour as the second Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY.  This was not only 
because states demonstrated increasing compliance, and NATO flexed its enforce-
ment powers; Arbour also opposed Rule 61 hearings on principle, “on the basis that 
they were incomprehensible to a criminal lawyer.”44  Arbour favoured issuing 
sealed indictments to SFOR, which helped facilitate the apprehension of suspects 
on the ground.  Arbour’s preferred methods also suggested a retreat from the public 
and diplomatic role adopted by Goldstone: “[p]ublic indictments and Rule 61 hear-
ings served Goldstone’s purpose of making the work highly visible, whereas sealed 
indictments were more suited to a functioning prosecutorial body.”45 
 
In her final chapter Kerr provides a cursory examination of the contrasting tenures 
of the three Chief Prosecutors of the ICTY, and suggests that, in Carla Del Ponte, 
the Office of the Prosecutor has returned to the “symbolic gestures” and public 
methods of the Goldstone period.46  Kerr seems to suggest that Del Ponte lacks the 
requisite political savvy for the position, and clearly favours the approach of Ar-
bour, who helped transform the ICTY into a fully functioning criminal court, and 
whose strictly “legal” self-presentation won the respect and confidence of the 
Tribunal’s political benefactors.47  The chapter contains a useful discussion of the 
Office of The Prosecutor’s approach to investigating alleged NATO war crimes, 
and provides a summary of the early stages of the Milosevic trial.   
 
Kerr’s discussion of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence seeks to highlight how 
the political context has affected the judicial interpretation of the procedural rules.  
Obviously, Rule 61’s usage has been determined by the political climate and the 
frequency of state cooperation.  Kerr also discusses the rules relating to admissibil-
                                                          
42 HAGAN, supra note 15, at 85.   
43 McDonald, supra note 29, at 561-562.   
44 KERR, supra note 5, at 100.   
45 Id,. at 159. 
46 Id., at 207. 
47 Id., at 92, 206. 
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ity, disclosure and protection of victims and witnesses.48  In relation to disclosure, 
Kerr stresses the uniqueness of Rule 70, which allows the Prosecution to obtain 
evidence derived from intelligence sources as a “lead” or “pointer” but which must 
not be disclosed in court so as to preserve national security.49  
 
Because of the timing of the book’s composition and publication, Kerr has not 
included a discussion of the UN Security Council’s Completion Strategy for the 
ICTY.50  This is a pity, for the debate surrounding the strategy highlights the politi-
cal considerations and external pressures that are affecting the Tribunal’s legal 
mandate during its final years.  This was the subject of judicial consideration in an 
interlocutory decision in Prosecutor v Milosevic relating to admissibility of written 
statements, in which the Appeals Chamber was forced to confront the relationship 
between the ICTY’s judicial work and the external political pressures brought to 
bear upon it for the rapid adjudication of cases.51  The appeal concerned the reach 
of Rule 92bis (“Proof of Facts other than by Oral Evidence”), which governs the 
admissibility of written statements prepared by prospective witnesses for the pur-
pose of legal proceedings.  The question to be determined by the Appeals Chamber 
was whether a written statement could be introduced without recourse to the strin-
gent Rule 92bis procedure if the prospective witness was present in court and will-
ing to attest to the written statement.  The Appeals Chamber held that, because the 
witness was present and able orally to attest to the accuracy of the written testi-
mony, the proposed written evidence did not attract the requirements of Rule 92bis, 
which contemplates that the written statement will be in lieu of oral testimony.52  
The fact that a written statement has been prepared for legal proceedings does not, 
of itself, attract Rule 92bis unless there will be no oral evidence on the written 
statement.  In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Hunt disagreed sharply with this 
interpretation of Rule 92bis.53 Judge Hunt discerned behind the Appeals Chamber’s 
decision a capitulation to the Completion Strategy:  
 
The Majority Appeals Chamber Decision drives a horse and cart through 
the previous interpretation of Rule 92bis, and it seriously prejudices the 
accused in ways already pointed out.  I recently stated, in an appeal from 
the Rwanda Tribunal, that the very proper endorsement by the Security 
Council “in the strongest terms” of the Completion Strategy of the Yugo-
slav Tribunal should not be interpreted as an encouragement by the Secu-
                                                          
48 Id., at 102-113. 
49 Id., at 106. 
50 See, especially, SC Res 1503, 4817th mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1503 (2003); SC Res 1534, 4935th mtg, UN 
Doc S/Res/1534 (2004). For a discussion of the development of the ICTY Completion strategy, see 
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rity Council to the Tribunal to conduct its trials so that they would be other 
than fair trials.  It is necessary to repeat that statement in the present case 
in order to apply it directly to the Majority Appeals Chamber Decision.  
That Decision unfortunately follows the trend of other recent decisions of 
the Appeals Chamber which reverse or ignore its previously carefully con-
sidered interpretations of the law or of the procedural rules, with a conse-
quential destruction of the rights of the accused enshrined in the Tribunal’s 
Statute and in customary international law.  The only reasonable explana-
tion for these decisions appears to be the desire to assist the prosecution to 
bring the Completion Strategy to a speedy conclusion.54  
 
It is likely that the political effect of the Completion Strategy upon the Tribunal’s 
jurisprudence will be the subject of increasing debate as the mandate of the Tribu-
nal draws to a close.55  Further political questions, including the effects of a more 
localised judicial process upon a fragile peace, are involved in the remittance of 
cases to national courts in the Former Yugoslavia under Rule 11bis of the Statute – 
a process currently absorbing a great deal of the Tribunal’s pre-trial work.56 
 
Kerr is ambivalent about the political ends the ICTY serves.  She accepts that “there 
is some merit” in the view that the Tribunal serves a dual political and legal role,57 
but elsewhere asserts that “[t]he Tribunal was a tool of politics, but it was a judicial, 
not a political tool.”  This vacillation concerning the relationship between law and 
politics is apparent throughout the book.  Much of Kerr’s discussion tends to assert 
statements rather than develop arguments, and competing perspectives are often 
overlooked or brushed aside. Beyond some interviews conducted by Kerr with key 
figures, the book does not introduce any new material. A more focused theoretical 
viewpoint, allowing Kerr to elaborate what she actually means by the terms “law” 
and “politics” in the international context, may have steadied her thesis and led to a 
richer account of this important topic.    
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